HAS JESUIT AND MARIST EDUCATION PRODUCED DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LEADERS IN ZAMBIA?

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Abstract
The introduction or re-introduction of multiparty politics in Africa has had a salutary effect on the production of knowledge about the role of Christian churches in politics. The Christian churches duly deserve to be praised, but to what extent? Can we possibly attribute the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the country to past pupils of Catholic mission schools such as Canisius, St. Paul's and Chassa Secondary Schools in the 1950s and the 1960s? That would be to introduce a "creation myth". The text below resulted from a qualitative survey to establish some facts about the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. Fifty pupils of Canisius, St. Paul's and Chassa Secondary Schools of the 1960s answered a questionnaire. Ten of the respondents volunteered for in-depth interviews. Twenty-nine of the total number of respondents had gone to Canisius and ten and eleven had gone to St. Paul's and Chassa respectively. Six out of the ten interviewed were university Lecturers and Professors. This research was carried out between 1996 and 1997. Over the years I have been casually talking to former pupils of the two schools wherever I have chanced them.

Introduction

Western Christian missionaries introduced modern formal education in Africa. Indeed mission stations have been described as oases of Western civilisation, and it has been incontestably established that Zambia partly owes its political independence to missionary educated men and women (Rotberg, 1965, Carmody, 1992, 1995). Twenty- seven years after independence the country went through a "second independence" from one-political party tyranny to plural politics. Hastings (1995:42) described the so called "democratisation" in some African countries as being driven by what he called a "democratic elite" from Irish Jesuit priests' and Canadian Marist brothers' schools, which were almost self-consciously cradles of democracy even if run a little autocratically. He contends that, from 1920s to the 1950s the principal secular contribution of the churches to black Africa was very probably the training for democracy of a tiny elite (1995: 42). However, it has been shown fairly conclusively by Carmody's (1992) definitive work on a secondary school run by Irish Jesuits in Zambia, that schooling there did not produce a democratic elite. It was not the case with the French Canadian Marist brothers' schools either (see Simpson, 1996 & 2003).

The thrust of the argument in this article is that Hastings' arguments are not finished tools for studying churches and democracy in Africa, but hypotheses which, while suggestive as guide to research, must be subordinate to research that has been done on mission schooling, and subjected as well, to available evidence. Hastings' propositions somewhat down-played other factors and more powerful ones for that matter, which led to the rise of not only nationalism but also plural politics in Africa.

Colonial missionary education and democracy

Carmody (1992, 1995, and 1999) acknowledges the fact that Irish Jesuits formed part of the engine that destroyed colonial rule in Zambia. Carmody has analysed the role that a Jesuit school played in the socio-political context of pre-independent Zambia. After independence, President Kaunda honoured the Jesuit Fr. Patrick Walsh with the distinction of Officer of the Companion order of Freedom in 1966. Fr. Walsh has been described as an ardent Irish nationalist deeply committed to social justice.

Irish Jesuits came to Zambia in 1950, to an already established mission known as Chikuni (Canisius Secondary School, Charles Lwanga Teachers College and Primary School). They had experience of secondary school education in Ireland where they had boarding schools for boys, and those who came to Zambia had been either students or teachers at Clongowes, which educated many patriotic Irish nationalist leaders (Carmody, 1992: 74). Canadian Marist brothers arrived in Zambia at the height of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. They established themselves in 1960 at St. Paul's in Kabwe and Chassa in Sinda.

Carmody's work on Chikuni is the first of its kind in Zambia, and it confirms Hortense Powdermaker's theory:

> The prevailing political awareness of Africans - literate and illiterate, adults and adolescents - had come primarily through the power of events, rather than through propaganda or formal education, and obviously, the main event was the Federation (1962: 284).

During the struggle against colonial rule, democracy was not the heart of the matter. The nationalist front was pre-occupied with freedom and self-rule. The cry was, to use Kwameh Nkrumah's famous slogan, "seek ye first the political freedom and all else shall follow."

The Irish Jesuits and Canadian Marist brothers contributed to the rise of nationalism by educating an elite not predisposed to a total acceptance of an alien suzerainty and colonial ideology (Carmody, 1992: 140). Speaking about Chikuni, Carmody (1995: 50) notes:

> By providing a strong authoritarian and academic programme at Canisius, the Jesuits empowered many Zambians to become potential leaders in the new state. Although Chikuni Jesuits claimed to be apolitical in their education at a time when such facilities were severely restricted, this, in itself was profoundly a political act. The degree to which Jesuits perceived it to be political in the sense of participating in national independence along the directions of the nationalists varied considerably.

Colonial mission education in Zambia was a replica of the British education system and Hastings (1995:15&40) thought that the more the African school system fitted the pattern of the British School system with sports and houses and prefects, Cambridge School Certificate and the rest, the more it was inherently a tool for the preparation of Western-type of democracies as they inevitably carried with them the

same ethos and ideals. This explanation still begs such questions as: Did the Prefect system engender the concept of 'representative government'? Did sports foster the concept of 'rule of law'? How did the Cambridge Certificate promote democratic values? Hastings (1995: 15) did not volunteer any explanation apart from advancing the view that "Quite certainly these were democratic ideals, even when inculcated *de haut en bas*." At this point his discussion becomes unfruitful because he ventures into the consequences of mission education which are empirically difficult to demonstrate. Having said that, I do not myself pretend to illustrate the type of consequences which are demonstrable.

Carmody (1999: 88-89) argues that "while the school system fitted the British pattern with sports, houses, prefects, and Cambridge certificates, it is unclear to what extent such schools were designed to prepare an elite for participatory politics as Hastings argued. Frequently, such institutions had highly autocratic administrations while the education itself focused more on passing exams than on personal development." Simpson (2003:39) also reports that: "In interviews with me, pioneer Marist Brothers foregrounded the organisational aspects of the school, especially the house and prefect system, as fundamental aspects of discipline and order." Asked "How would you describe your school at the time you were there?" My respondents reported:

Autocratic 70%, Democratic 4%, Liberal 18%, Military barrack 8%. The striking contradiction Hastings made was in his stress on the autocratic schooling environment in mission schools and the 'democratic elite' they produced. Not even did the qualifying expression of 'probably' modify the thrust of his argument in the direction of admittingits deficiency. If at all democratic principles were verbally communicated in the classroom, they were not communicated in action.

It is quite a daunting task to establish and popularise the notion that pupils perceived consciously or even unconsciously for that matter that what they were going through was a preparation for democratic leadership or a democratic society. In the same vein, it is contentious to say as Hastings does, that missionaries took it for granted that their secondary education was a preparation for a democratic society of the sort they had known at home (1995: 42). There seems to have been no evidence provided to support this claim.

The African boy or girl came to mission schools with one clear motive; to receive formal schooling in order to live a good life in future. Towards the end of the 1950s, Zambia became progressively articulated to a capitalist mode of production, and western type of schooling proved essential for personal advancement. Young men were enabled to become clerks, engineers, and teachers (Carmody, 1989:185). So, the demand for mission schooling was mainly a consequence of the growth of new economic opportunities created by the transition from subsistence to an exchange economy. For this, young men were ready to endure the discipline in mission schools as Simpson (1996: 97) referring to St. Paul's aptly points out: "Young African men who submitted themselves to the school regime did so having the more particular aim of securing employment in Independent Zambia." He further discovered that: "St. Paul's equipped its successful students with the means to achieve certification which could then be converted into employment in the labour market or entry into higher education"(Simpson, 2003: 57).

Although schooling brought about westernisation in political terms, it brought about neither a Western democracy nor a practicable African derived democracy. Furthermore, if Irish Jesuits and Canadian Marist brothers wanted to form good Christians who would relate their religion to their inspirations and ideals, this did not happen. Whether or not missionaries detected it, the overriding motive in the African boy or girl for coming to mission schools was to gain some education for "survival". An Irish Jesuits' and Canadian Marist brothers' past pupil, (Bob (pseudonym)) told me: "We were the first to open St. Paul's. Our first Principal was a tyrant, but a good man he was. He told us to 'learn and you will overcome a lot of obstacles; you will live good and decent lives.' That was quite inspiring and motivating." Bob also told me that as pioneers they put up with a lot of difficulties in the school. He said that they sat on pieces of wood suspended on bricks as they waited for the desks and chairs to come from Southern Rhodesia.

A much-quoted book on certification in Africa is that of Ronald Dore, *The Diploma Disease*. To Dore:

> The effect of schooling, the way it alters a man's capacity and will to do things, depends not only on what he learns, or the way he learns it, but also on why he [or she] learns it. That is at the basis of the distinction between schooling, which is education, and schooling, which is only qualification, a mere process of certificating or 'credentialing' (1976: 8).

Using Dore's distinction, I would argue that while the mission of the Irish Jesuits and Canadian Marist brothers was to offer the African education, the African himself was more interested in the result of the missionaries' education - the certificate. In fact the missionary promoted this attitude by stressing the importance of education as the gateway to success. As a result of this, "Mission projects" of these missionaries were heavily circumscribed.

Powdermaker's thesis constitutes a fountainhead for much theoretical and empirical enquiry into mission schooling, not only in the relationship between, church and politics, but church and democracy as well. It is unlikely that Bob who had gone to St. Paul's and later to Canisius, was inaccurate in saying: "We learnt something about democracy. We learnt about the separation of powers; of Judiciary, Executive and Legislative in the British government. That was basically what we learnt, and the definition of Democracy of course." The questionnaire findings support this memory. Asked "Did lessons in Civics educate you in democratic values"? The respondents answered: Yes, but they had no impact, 28%; To some extent, 24%; Very little, 26%; Yes, and they had an impact on me later in life, 22%.

All the orally interviewed respondents expressed the opinion that their Civics lessons from Standard III to VI were far more comprehensive and informative than those in Forms I and II. However, all the respondents interviewed reported that they could not claim to have been well grounded in the issues of democracy. It seems Civics lessons did not, in the short and long run, produce democrats.

Irish Jesuits and Canadian Marist brothers did not bring about a democratic revolution or a democratic culture in Zambia, otherwise the country ought to have

been a democracy from independence, or can one argue that autocratic governance blocked democratic expressions? There is still work to be done to establish to what extent mission schooling stimulated or developed human expression in matters of democratic governance. The task will be one of determining how knowledge gained by mission boys and girls has been used in their thinking beyond the situations in which the learning occurred. Some of my respondents could not possibly make a clear-cut distinction between being a politician and being a democratic politician. One respondent wrote: "Civics lessons had minimal impact at the time of learning, but later on, the impact was seen because most Canisians became active in the politics of the country."

One of the secular aims of the Irish Jesuits was to educate future leaders of the country, but whatever education was being offered, it was done in the vogue of the widely held belief that too much education made the Africans "vain and proud". Moreover, Jesuits "generally avoided explicitly political issues except for occasional and subtle remarks during a History, Civics or Economics class where teachers with an Irish background often lost no opportunities to compare the Northern Rhodesian situation with Ireland of the 1920s" (Carmody, 1995:22). Indeed political issues were generally avoided in the classrooms because G.H. Rusbridger in his book *Civics of Northern Rhodesia*, Cape Town: OUP, 1953, seriously warns the teacher not to teach what is not contained "in this book". Rusbridger's book was the main Civics text for Northern Rhodesia's secondary schools. At St. Paul's, according to Simpson (2003:57), the debating society was not allowed to debate either political or religious topics. On the sensitive issue of politics, there were several reminders to the staff, for most of the early period either entirely or largely expatriate, of the necessity to be guarded in the expression of any opinion.

Bob reported: "Father Robert Thompson sometimes abandoned his religious instructions class and began to tell us to step up pressure on the British in order for us to be independent, but he advised us not to send away foreigners after independence." This would indicate that some missionaries regarded nationalism as something not only inevitable but as something legitimate - perhaps a healthy aspiration for rights and responsibilities that were due to the people in whose country they lived. The point at issue, however, is that democratic values were not inculcated into the minds of the boys in question. In fact the administrators aimed at maintaining good relations with the colonial government. One respondent who was at Canisius from 1962 to 1963 and played a key role in the food riot of 1963 wrote: "I was personally told by the Principal that I could not go to any other school in Zambia. I was told that I was too political and that I would instigate other students to rise against a school administration and the government of the day."

Mission schooling and nationalism

While an incipient African nationalism, nurtured by visions of self-government and reaction to European ethnocentrism, influenced the more keen-sighted among the educated African elite to press for independence in Zambia, those who started nationalist politics were not Irish Jesuits' and Canadian Marist brothers' educated elite, but a Protestant educated elite. This is not to say, as Hastings (1995:40) puts it: "Protestant Christianity could reasonably be seen as the seed-bed of democracy."

Was the cry for independence a product of the Protestant African missions? The truth about Zambia is that the first form of a political party by Africans in the name of Northern Rhodesia's Welfare Society, which was formed in 1923, was at a Protestant mission at Mwenzo. Catholic missions like Chikuni, Chassa and St. Paul's did not give rise to social welfare organisations, and the few Northern Rhodesian Catholics to make a name in politics, such as Pascal Sokota and the famous trade union leader Lawrence Katilungu, had learned their social awareness at the mines (Garvey, 1994:180). In any case, the two, and the group at Mwenzo and those who joined later, whether Irish Jesuits' or Canadian Marist brothers' educated did not demand democratic governance from the colonial regime. Clearly then, to say that democratic values were transmitted to would-be nationalists and post-colony leaders of multiparty politics of the 1990s is to raise a debate.

The Methodist clergyman, Rev. Colin Morris (1964:17) made the point: "Most of Northern Rhodesia's nationalist leaders got their first test of democracy and their first experience of its methods in *leaders' meetings* and Church Councils. Their political skills and efficiency in running party organisations are owed to the missionary to a degree that they would care to acknowledge." It might have been the case in the Presbyterian churches but certainly not in the Catholic Church.

If Morris' statement is anything to go by, one would assume that the Presbyterians who had attended Catholic schools in question were or are far better informed about democracy than the Catholic pupils. Indeed, Hastings (1995:42) is of the view that many Protestant missionary engaged with educating the African had an outlook which presupposed that there would come a time when Africa would have its own constitutional and democratic governments. Unfortunately, the constitutional and democratic governments were presided over by one party one despotic president.

Irish Jesuits' past pupils as champions of one party rule

On 13 December 1972 Kenneth Kaunda proclaimed Zambia a One-Party Participatory Democracy. Ten months before this date, a Commission of Enquiry, hand-picked by Kaunda himself went around the country to listen to the views of the public on the new political system that Kaunda's Cabinet had already decided to adopt. Mainza Chona, a former pupil of Irish Jesuits at Canisius, chaired the Commission of Enquiry. Humphrey Mulemba, as Vice-Chairman assisted him. He had gone to Canisius as well. Among the Commissioners was the Roman Catholic Archbishop Elias Mutale. He too had been to Canisius. Chona and Mulemba were baptised and practising Catholics.

The new political system was justified on the basis that "the African" did not have sufficient political experience and that the multiparty politics bred disunity, subversion and tribalism, as Chona (1973) argued:

> Zambia had found from bitter experience that multiparty system encouraged indiscipline as crooks jumped from one party to another spreading dissension by false rumours. They also encouraged tribalism and now scoundrels have no refuge

> in One Party Participatory Democracy. We have fixed them; they are now like monkeys having only one tree.

When no former pupil of Canisius, St. Paul's or Chassa raised their voice against the new political system, Fr. Max Prokoph (1982), who was once Headmaster of Canisius said:

> I must confess I have never seen the reason for speaking of a 'participatory' democracy. Any democracy is of its nature participatory that is, sharing in decision making, claiming rights and sharing duties. Anybody who does not do his share is a passenger or even a parasite. However that may be, I presume the superfluous word 'participatory' was added as a reminder of what should be obvious.

The One-Party system swept through Africa like the attempt at democratisation in recent years. The question of how they came about is fairly easy to answer. Both resulted from "winds of change". It seems therefore, that we cannot evaluate mission schools' set up and their impact on the local people on European basis.

From one-party rule to multiparty politics: towards a more adequate explanation

Let me begin this section by pointing out that the information in the section will sound moribund and sterile, and all too familiar and perhaps utterly boring. But I feel it is worth presenting to underscore my argument and to contextualise my perspective.

The Jesuits and Marist Brothers worked within the newly created nation-state which rapidly adopted the system of "one-party, participatory democracy". Referring to the Marist Brothers, Simpson (1996:98 & 2003: 56-57) says:

> It could be argued that the Brothers, while providing an education that was eagerly sought after, neglected to offer any radical critique of a political climate that brooked no contradiction, or of a system of education whose declared aim was the production of leaders, an endeavour which inevitably enhanced the position of a very select few, and in the process ignored the poorest of the poor. In this, they were in danger of losing sight of the vision of their Founder, and of being deaf to his call to assist "those most in need".

Richard Hall (1984:14) predicted: "If change does come, while the President (Kaunda) remains in good health, it is unlikely to be through any mass democratic activity, but rather out of pressures from within UNIP Central Committee." This prediction was completely wrong. The change from one-party rule to a multiparty system was brought about by a mass democratic activity. As one-party rule became increasingly autocratic, the former pupils of Irish Jesuits and Canadian Marist brothers maintained a resounding silence. In an act of rare bravery at that time, Elias

Chipimo (1980), former pupil of Canisius spoke against one-party rule in these words:

> It is a numbing experience that successive presidents all over the Third World tend to end up with a bullet in their heads. Isn't there something wrong somewhere if beneath apparent calm and submission, a sergeant rises and bumps off the head of a president to an immediate popular acclaim. Where is there going to be order if the only change in leadership is to be by death in the saddle, and especially by death of an assassin's bullet. The multiparty system was the surest way of avoiding coups and eliminating the disgraceful tendency of presidents ending up with bullets in their heads.

Chipimo was addressing members of the Law Society of Zambia in Ndola town. He was challenging Kaunda at the time when William Tolbert had just been assassinated.

Multiparty politics have not yet proved to be the panacea to Zambia's political excesses, nor have they brought about democracy. To the majority of illiterate and some literate voters multiparty politics and democracy seem to mean the right to vote for the person you want.

By now I must have made it indubitably clear that some post-one-party rule leaders may be products of missionary schooling, but it is premature to suggest that schooling promoted their struggle for democracy. In stating this, let me then describe how a multiparty system was instituted. Putting the concept in a historic perspective, its development has been inconsistent and ambivalent as far as the ultimate direction of such developments is concerned. Initially there was some support for the idea of a common goal of democracy but in the 1970s, with misgivings about culture imperialism and with widespread evidence of one party and military governments, this support gave way to a greater concern with order and stability (Higgott, 1993) Since the collapse of Communism formerly autocratic Marxist-Leninist governments both in eastern Europe and in Africa have turned their attention to a new democratic agenda. Moreover, Western governments have become much more reluctant to support dictators simply because they were pro-Western and anti-Communist. Indeed, international funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the World Bank and others are making democratic institutions and the protection of human rights a condition of financial aid. The United Nations Development Plan (UNDP, 1992) forthrightly states:

> The purpose of human development is to increase people's range of choices. If they are not free to make those choices the entire process becomes a mockery so, freedom is more than an idealistic goal - it is a vital component of human development. People who are politically free can take part in planning and decision-making. And they can ensure that society is organised through consensus and consultation rather than dictated by an autocratic elite.

The starting point for a presentation of a historic origin of plural politics in Zambia and Africa at large is President Gorbachev's proclamation of *glasnost* and

perestroika in 1989. This is said to have sent shock waves throughout Africa's One Party states. The "wind of change" from Soviet Union did not spare Kaunda, who for 27 years remained unwilling to put his popularity to real test.

When the multiparty voice was raised Kaunda scoffed at the call and said that it was insane for anyone to compare what was happening in Eastern Europe to the situation in Zambia. "Zambia", he argued was "too advanced in its governance system to look for such examples." He went on to say: "In Zambia, a human centred socialism has already been achieved through one-party participatory democracy and there is no need to change the system that has worked so well"(Muyunda, 1990:30).

Academicians in the University of Zambia who were later joined by businessmen and women, farmers and some leaders of the labour movement began the call for a multiparty system. The Zambian people were encouraged to press on for multiparty politics when one-party rule in Mali, Benin, Sao Tome and Principe and the Cape Verde; was replaced by multiparty politics. However, it was the economic problems in the country, which accelerated the political transformation. At independence, Kaunda's government inherited a foreign exchange reserve of £800,000,000, but by 31 October 1991, Zambia had accumulated a staggering debt of £8.2 billion. Some of the blame can be laid on factors outside Kaunda's control, but much of the blame must fall squarely on his shoulders. He had initiated economic reforms, which saw government take over 20 foreign companies. He also initiated the take over of the copper industry. The terms on which the transactions were completed turned out to be costly. In the long run the nationalised industries became the opposite of Kaunda's intention that they would generate wealth and employment for the country. Instead, government had to fund these industries due to, among other things, poor and inept management, corruption and nepotism, which led to over employment. These problems were compounded by chronic lethargy.

By 1990 Zambia was a by word for poverty, mismanagement, bureaucratic surveillance, institutionalised sycophancy and megalomania. The Central Statistical Office at the national Headquarter produced the following data on poverty levels during the 1980- 1990 period:

ABSOLUTE POVERTY (1980-90): Percentage of people living in absolute Poverty. **Urban: 47%** **Rural: 80%** **Whole country: 64%.**

The economic nadir, resulting in social-political disintegration reminded many a Zambian about the good old days. Frederick Chiluba, who won the presidency from Kaunda, capitalised on the poor economic performance of Kaunda, and during political rallies his statements carried enthusiasm and fire by invoking the imagery of the Bible in a way that his hearers were able to appreciate it in the light of their political and economic status. He made gestures towards the 'deliverance' of Zambians. For example, at the inaugural campaign rally for the introduction of multiparty politics in Kabwe town on 18 August 1990, Chiluba called on Zambians to come on "the ship of freedom" for a ride to the Promised Land. He likened the multiparty politics discourse and the support it was receiving to the biblical match of Israelites from Egypt to Canaan (*Multiparty News* 1990:1).

On 31st October 1991 Chiluba and his Movement comprehensively defeated Kaunda. The people who voted for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) did so because, however dimly, they perceived the party as being good and that it was going to rebuild the economy. Chiluba's words on the eve of the 28th Anniversary of independence and 1st Anniversary of a "democratic" Zambia captures the hopes of those who had voted for him. He said:

> Indeed the second day of November 1991, when the MMD took over the government of this country, was a day of glorious hopes, of hope for the future, hope that at last we would be in a position to lead this country from misery back into the community of civilised nations, hope that our children will inherit a better country than the devastated moon landscape left to us - ruined by the greed, incompetence and inappropriate, misleading ideologies conceived with no regard for the ordinary man and born in infertile minds (Chanda, nd: 58).

No doubt then, Zambia's multiparty politics is a result of a lot of factors, prominent among them, is the worldwide political changes of the 1990s. Indeed, all the interviewed respondents expressed a consensus on the failure of the mission schools in question to educate a "democratic elite"; a consensus summarised in the following words by Pat: "We went through discipline and we received good education. I am afraid I can't tell you that the new political order has much to do with us. I think this is more of an epoch in Africa." To illustrate the failure of his school in democratic education, Don a former St. Paul's pupil said: "Many of us Catholic mission educated have proved ineffective in political leadership. Look at (gives examples of two past pupils who performed poorly in the MMD government - one lost his parliamentary seat in an election and the other was not re-adopted by his party to re-contest his parliamentary seat in the election)." Reminded about other mission-educated men, who had succeeded in their political careers, he retorted: "Yes, they have only made themselves successful. Mind you! Aren't the majority of the people still living as if they were in the Stone Age period?"

The multiparty voice in Zambia was quite unsettling to the one-party system's leadership because it came at a time when the country had become economically bankrupt. But while Kaunda's party hosted especially many of Irish Jesuits' educated men, it did not crumble within. A few opportunists left Kaunda to jump on the bandwagon of the MMD, but these were exceptions, because many old guards of UNIP, especially those who constituted the January 1964 cabinet (except for Arthur Wina and Sikota Wina) still remained loyal to Kaunda, even after his short-lived retirement from politics in 1991. My question here is that why didn't the democratic elite in Kaunda's party, upon seeing the birth of the MMD immediately say "Aha! This is what we have been waiting for, let us support political pluralism?" Moreover, former pupils of Canisius, St. Paul's or Chassa secondary did not form the MMD, not a single one of them was in the forefront of the formation of this political party. A former pupil, Stan of Chassa bemoaned the absence of former Chassa Boys Secondary School in politics. He could only name one Member of Parliament in 1998. Stan also informed me that a Mr Nkhoma who had been Central Bank

governor and later became UNIP party president for a brief period had been to Chassa Secondary School and described him as "a disaster in politics."

Conclusion

By way of a case study I have demonstrated in this article, the fact that while the re-introduction of the multiparty system in Zambia may have connection to Irish priests' and Canadian brothers' schooling, there are a number of other factors which provide even more powerful explanations of the "democracy" in the country. I have identified these as the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union, the poor economic situation resulting in massive poverty in Zambia and the multiparty wind of change in Africa. Hastings' argument overshot the mark by pushing far too hard the notion that, the so-called "democracy" in some African countries is being driven by a "democratic elite", educated by Irish Jesuit priests and Canadian Marist brothers, a notion that he did not pause to test although he would have been the first to concede the importance of doing so. Nonetheless, his analysis should open up important lines of enquiry because it is stimulating. The question to researchers is: how would one measure the ways, and the degree to which mission schooling has contributed to the rise of multiparty politics in Africa?

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